Abstract-Recent studies show that millimeter wave (mmWave) communications can offer orders of magnitude, which increases in the cellular capacity. However, the secrecy performance of an mmWave cellular network has not been investigated so far. Leveraging the new path-loss and blockage models for mmWave channels, which are significantly different from the conventional microwave channel, this paper comprehensively studies the network-wide physical layer security performance of the downlink transmission in an mmWave cellular network under a stochastic geometry framework. We first study the secure connectivity probability and the average number of perfect communication links per unit area in a noise-limited mmWave network for both non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers scenarios, respectively. Then, we evaluate the effect of the artificial noise (AN) on the secrecy performance, and derive the analysis result of average number of perfect communication links per unit area in an interference-limited mmWave network. Numerical results demonstrate the network-wide secrecy performance, and provide interesting insights into how the secrecy performance is influenced by various network parameters: antenna array pattern, base station intensity, and AN power allocation.
tional microwave network in band below 6 GHz [1] [2] [3] . Due to the small wavelength, the mmWave cellular network is different from the conventional microwave network in the following ways: large number of antennas, sensitivity to blockages, and variable propagation laws, etc [4] . Recently, based on the real-world measurements in [3] , spatial statistical models of the mmWave channel have been built in [5] , which reveal the different path loss characteristics of the lineof-sight (LOS) and non-line-of-sight (NLOS) links. Under the new channel model, the network-wide performance of a mmWave cellular has attracted increasing attentions, and many works have investigated the SINR distribution, coverage, and average ergodic rate of the network under a stochastic geometry framework [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . They show that the mmWave network has a great potential to provide tremendous data traffic increase.
All the above works have focused on the rate/reliability performance of the mmWave network, however, its secrecy performance has not been investigated so far. Given the ubiquitousness of wireless connections, an enormous amount of sensitive and confidential information, e.g. financial data, electronic cryptography, and private video, have been transmitted via wireless channels. Thus, providing a secure service is one of the top priorities in the design and implementation of mmWave networks [12] . In this paper, we investigate the physical layer security performance of mmWave networks by adopting the stochastic geometry framework.
A. Background
Physical layer security has been identified as a promising strategy that exploits randomness of wireless medium to protect the confidential information from wiretapping [13] , [14] . Recently, multiple-antenna technology becomes a powerful tool for enhancing the physical layer security in random networks [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] . With the degrees of freedom provided by multiple antennas, the transmitter can adjust its antenna steering orientation to exploit the maximum directivity gain while reducing the signal leakage to eavesdroppers [18] [19] [20] , or radiate the artificial nosie (AN) for jamming potential eavesdroppers [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] . The secure connectivity, secrecy rate and secrecy outage of multi-antenna transmissions in wireless random networks have been studied in [18] and [19] , respectively. The impact of AN on the security of random networks has been studied in [23] [24] [25] .
However, all of the above works focus on conventional microwave networks, and the obtained results can not be applied to mmWave networks directly, due to the distinctive features of mmWave channel characteristics. For example, mmWave signals are more sensitive to blockage effects, and the fading statistical characteristics of the LOS link and NLOS link are totally different [3] . For characterizing the blockage effects of mmWave signals, different mmWave channel models have been proposed in [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . In [6] , an exponential blockage model has been proposed, and such model has been approximated as a LOS ball based blockage model for the coverage analysis in [4] and [7] . In [8] , the authors adopted the exponential blockage model to perform the coverage and capacity analysis for mmWave ad hoc networks. In [10] , the authors proposed a ball based blockage model which is validated by using field measurements in New York and Chicago. Taking the outage state emerging in the mmWave communication into consideration, in [11] , the authors have proposed a two-ball approximate blockage model for the analysis of the coverage and average rate of the multi-tier mmWave cellular network.
Under these new characteristics of mmWave channels, the secrecy performance of a mmWave cellular network will be significantly different from the conventional microwave network, which should be re-evaluated. The efficiency of traditional physical layer security techniques should be re-checked as well. Recently, the secrecy performance of a point-to-point mmWave communication has been studied in [31] , which has shown that mmWave systems can enable significant secrecy improvement compared with conventional microwave systems. However, the network-wide secrecy performance of the mmWave cellular communication is still unknown, which motivates our work.
B. Contribution
In this paper, using the stochastic geometry framework and the blockage model proposed in [10] , we proposed a systematic secrecy performance analysis approach for the mmWave cellular communication, by modeling the random locations of the base stations (BSs) and eavesdroppers as two independent homogeneous Possion point processes (PPPs). Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1) Secrecy performance analysis of noise-limited mmWave cellular networks. We characterize the secrecy performance of a noise-limited mmWave cellular network that is applicable to medium/sparse network deployments, where each BS only adopts the directional beamforming to transmit the confidential information. Considering two cases: the non-colluding eavesdropper case and the colluding eavesdroppers case, we derive the analysis result of the secure connectivity probability and the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the received SNR at the typical receiver and eavesdropper, respectively. The secure connectivity probability facilitates the evaluation of the probability of the existence of secure connections from a typical transmitter to its intended receiver. With the CDF of the received SNR at the typical receiver and eavesdropper, we can characterize the average number of perfect communication links per unit area statistically in the random network. We show that the high gain narrow beam antenna is very important for enhancing the secrecy performance of mmWave networks. 2) Secrecy performance analysis of AN assisted mmWave cellular networks. When AN is transmitted concurrently with the confidential information for interfering potential eavesdroppers, the AN radiation would increase the network interference. Thus, taking the network interference into consideration, we characterize the CDF of received SINRs at the intended receiver and noncolluding eavesdroppers. The secrecy probability and average number of perfect communication links per unit area of the AN assisted transmission have also been derived. The optimal power allocation between the AN and confidential signal is shown to depend on the array pattern and the intensity of eavesdroppers.
C. Paper Organization and Notations
In Section II, the system model and mmWave channel characteristics are introduced. In Section III, considering the noise-limited mmWave cellular communication, we characterize the secure connectivity probability and average number of perfect communication links per unit area. In Section IV, taking the inter-cell interference into consideration, we characterize the average number of perfect communication links per unit area of the AN-assisted mmWave communication. Numerical results are provided in Section V and the paper is concluded in Section VI.
Notation: x ∼ gamma(k, m) denotes the gamma-distributed random variable with shape k and scale m, γ (x, y) is the lower incomplete gamma function [36, 
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider the downlink secure communication in the mmWave cellular network, where multiple spatially distributed BSs transmit the confidential information to authorized users in the presence of multiple malicious eavesdroppers. In the following subsections, we first introduce the system model and channel characteristics adopted in this paper, which have been validated in [4] , [8] , and [10] . With such models, we give some important results on probability theory which will be used in the performance analysis. The secrecy performance metrics adopted are given in Section II-G.
A. BS and Eavesdropper Layout
The locations of the BSs are modeled by a homogeneous PPP B of intensity λ B . Using PPP for modeling the irregular BSs locations has been shown to be an accurate and tractable approach for characterizing the downlink performance of the cellular network [34] . As [23] [24] [25] [26] , the locations of multiple eavesdroppers are modeled as an independent homogeneous PPP, E , of intensity λ E . Such random PPP model is well motivated by the random and unpredictable eavesdroppers' locations. Furthermore, just as [23] and [27] [28] [29] , we consider the worst-case scenario by facilitating the eavesdroppers' multi-user decodability, i.e., eavesdroppers can perform successive interference cancellation [30] to eliminate the interference due to the information signals from other interfering BSs. The total transmit power of each BS is P t .
B. Directional Beamforming
For compensating the significant path-loss at mmWave frequencies, highly directional beamforming antenna arrays are deployed at BSs to perform the directional beamforming. For mathematical tractability and similar to [4] , [8] , [10] , and [11] , the antenna pattern is approximated by a sectored antenna model in [32] . In particular,
where θ b is the beam width of the main lobe, M s and m s are the array gains of main and sidelobes, respectively. In this paper, we assume that each BS can get the perfect CSI estimation, including angles of arrivals and fading, and then, they can adjust their antenna steering orientation array for adjusting the boresight direction of antennas to their intended receivers and maximizing the directivity gains. In the following, we denote the boresight direction of the antennas as 0°. Therefore, the directivity gain of the intended link is M s . For each interfering link, the angle θ is independently and uniformly distributed in [−π, π], which results in a random directivity gain G b (θ ). For simplifying the performance analysis, just as [10] and [31] , the authorized users and malicious eavesdroppers are both assumed to be equipped with a single omnidirectional antenna in this paper. 1
C. Small-Scale Fading
Just as [4] and [8] , we assume that the small-scale fading of each link follows independent Nakagami fading, and the Nakagami fading parameter of the LOS (NLOS) link is N L (N N ). For simplicity, N L and N N are both assumed to be positive integers. In the following, the small-scale channel gain from the BS at x ∈ R 2 to the authorized user (eavesdropper) at y ∈ R 2 is expressed as h xy (g xy ).
D. Blockage Model
The blockage model proposed in [10] is adopted, which can be regarded as an approximation of the statistical blockage model in [5, eq. (8) ] and [11] , and incorporates the LOS ball model proposed in [4] and [7] as a special case. As shown by [9] and [10] , the blockage model proposed in [10] is simple yet flexible enough to capture blockage statistics, coverage and rate trends in mmWave cellular networks. In particular, defining q L (r ) as the probability that a link of length r is LOS,
for some 0 ≤ C ≤ 1. 
E. Path Loss Model
Just as [4] and [10] , different path loss laws are applied to LOS and NLOS links. In particular, given a link from x ∈ R 2 to y ∈ R 2 , its path loss L(x, y) can be calculated by
where α L and α N are the LOS and NLOS path loss exponents, and C L 10 
F. User Association
For maximizing the receiving quality of authorized users, just as [4] and [10] , one authorized user is assumed to be associated with the BS offering the lowest path loss to him, since the network considered is homogeneous. Thus, for the typical authorized user at origin, its serving BS is located at x * arg max x∈ B L(x, o). Denoting the distance from the typical authorized user to the nearest BS in j as d * j for j = {L, N}, the following Lemma 1 provides their probability distribution functions (pdf), and the obtained statistics hold for a generic authorized user, due to Slivnyak's theorem [34] .
Lemma 1: Given the typical authorized user observes at least one LOS BS, the pdf of d
On the other hand, the pdf of d * N is given by
where I (.) is the indicator function.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
Then, the following lemma gives the probability that the typical authorized user is associated with a LOS or NLOS BS.
Lemma 2: The probability that the authorized user is associated with a NLOS BS, A N , is given by
where μ
The probability that the typical authorized user is associated with a LOS BS is given by
The proof is given in Appendix B. With the smallest path loss association rule, the typical authorized user would be associated with the nearest LOS BS in L or the nearest NLOS BS in N . The following lemma gives the pdf of the distance between the typical authorized user and its serving BS in j , i.e., r j , ∀ j ∈ {L, N}.
Lemma 3: On the condition that the serving BS is in L , the pdf of the distance from the typical authorized user to its serving BS in L is given in (7) , shown at the top of this page.
On the condition that the serving BS is in N , the pdf of the distance from the typical authorized user to its serving BS in N is given in (8) , shown at the top of this page.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C.
G. Secrecy Performance Metric
In this paper, we assume that the channels are all quasi-static fading channels. The legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers can obtain their own CSI, but mmWave BSs do not know the instantaneous CSI of eavesdroppers. For protecting the confidential information from wiretapping, each BS encodes the confidential data by the Wyner code [13] . Then two code rates namely, the rate of the transmitted codewords R b , and the rate of the confidential information R s should be determined before the data transmission, and R b − R s is the cost for securing the confidential information. The details of the code construction can be found in [13] and [33] . In this paper, just as [23] , [26] , and [33] , we adopt the fixed rate transmission, where R b and R s are fixed during the information transmission. For the secrecy transmission over quasi-static fading channels, the perfect secrecy can not always be guaranteed. Therefore, as indicated in [18] , [26] , and [33] , an outage-based secrecy performance metric is more suitable. Therefore, we analyze the secrecy performance of the mmWave communication by considering both the secure connectivity probability and average number of perfect communication links per unit area.
1) Secure connectivity probability [18] . Secure connectivity probability introduced in [18] , is defined as the probability that the secrecy rate is nonnegative. Using the secure connectivity probability, we aim to statistically characterize the existence of secure connection between any randomly chosen BS and its intended authorized user in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers.
2) Average number of perfect communication links per unit
area [26] . When R b and R s are given, we define the links that have perfect connection and secrecy as perfect communication links. Then, the mathematical definition of the average number of perfect communication links per unit area is given as follows.
• Connection Probability. When R b is below the capacity of legitimate links, authorized users can decode signals with an arbitrary small error, and thus perfect connection can be assured. Otherwise, connection outage would occur. The connection probability is denoted as p con .
• Secrecy Probability. When the wiretapping capacity of eavesdroppers is below the rate redundancy R e R b − R s , there will be no information leakage to potential eavesdroppers, and thus perfect secrecy of the link can be assured [13] . Otherwise, secrecy outage would occur. The secrecy probability is denoted as p sec . Following [26, eq. (29) ], the average number of perfect communication links per unit area is
Remark 1: With the given R b and R s , the average achievable secrecy throughput per unit area ω can be calculated by ω = N p R s .
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE OF THE NOISE-LIMITED MILLIMETER WAVE COMMUNICATION
In this section, we evaluate the secrecy performance of the direct transmission for the noise-limited mmWave communication. As pointed out by [3] , [5] , [10] , and [11] , highly directional transmissions used in mmWave systems combined with short cell radius results in links that are noise-dominated, especially for densely blocked settings (e.g., urban settings) and medium/sparse network deployments [10] , [11] . This distinguishes from current dense cellular deployments where links are overwhelmingly interference-dominated. Therefore, just as [10] and [11] , we first study the secrecy performance of the noise-limited mmWave communication without considering the effect of inter-cell interference. The received SNR by the typical authorized user at origin and the eavesdropper at z with respect to the serving BS can be expressed as
and
N 0 is the noise power in the form of N 0 = 10
10 , where
BW is the transmission bandwidth and F d B is the noise figure [11] . With the array pattern in (1), G b (θ ) seen by the eavesdropper is a Bernoulli random variable whose probability mass function (PMF) is given by
A. Non-Colluding Eavesdroppers
In this subsection, assuming that the random distributed eavesdroppers are non-colluding, we evaluate the secrecy performance of the mmWave cellular network.
1) Secure Connectivity Probability: We first study the secure connectivity probability, τ n , of the mmWave communication in the presence of multiple non-colluding eavesdroppers. A secure connection is possible if the condition
≥ 1 holds [18] , and the secure connectivity probability can be calculated by
We can see that the wiretapping capability of multiple eavesdroppers is determined by the path loss process G b (θ )L(x * , z)g x * z . Thus, for facilitating the performance evaluation, the following process is introduced.
Definition 1: The path loss process with fading (PLPF), denoted as N E , is the point process on R + mapped from E ,
where
, z ∈ E and x denotes the location of the wiretapped BS. We sort the elements of N E in ascending order and denote the sorted elements of N E as
Note that N E involves both the impact of small fading and spatial distribution of eavesdroppers, which is an ordered process. Consequently, N E determines the wiretapping capability of eavesdroppers. We then have the following lemma.
Lemma 4: The PLPF N E is an one-dimensional nonhomogeneous PPP with the intensity measure where q L C, q N 1 − C, and j,in (V, t)
The proof is given in Appendix D. The following theorem gives the analysis result of the secure connectivity probability in the presence of non-colluding eavesdroppers.
Theorem 1: In the case of non-colluding eavesdroppers, the secure connectivity probability is
Proof: The detailed derivations are given in (13) , shown at the bottom of the next page, where step (e) is due to Definition 1, step ( f ) follows the PPP's void probability [34] , and step (g) is due to the law of total probability. When the serving BS is a LOS BS, h x * o ∼ gamma (N L , 1) and the pdf of r L is given by (7), and when the serving BS is a NLOS BS, h x * o ∼ gamma (N N , 1) and the pdf of r N is given by (8) . Finally, substituting the pdf of h x * o , r L , and r N into (13), τ n can be obtained.
Theoretical results in Theorem 1 are validated in Fig. 1 , where we plot the secure connectivity probability τ n versus λ E . For all the simulations in this paper, 100000 trials are used. From Fig. 1 , we can find that theoretical curves coincide with the simulation ones well, which validates the theoretical result in Theorem 1.
2) Average Number of Perfect Communication Links Per Unit Area:
In the following, we study the average number of perfect communication links per unit area, N p , of the mmWave communication in the presence of non-colluding eavesdroppers. Firstly, we should derive the analytical result of the connection probability and secrecy probability of a mmWave communication link, given by
respectively, where T c 2 R c −1 and T e 2 R e −1 . Then, N p can be calculated by (9) . We have the following theorem.
Theorem 2: For the non-colluding eavesdroppers case, the analytical result of p con is given by
and the analytical result of p sec,n is given by
Proof: p con can be derived as (17) at the bottom of this page. p sec,n can be derived as follows
where step (g) is due to Definition 1, and step (h) is due to the PPP's void probability [34] .
B. Colluding Eavesdroppers
In this subsection, we study the secrecy performance of the mmWave communication by considering the worst case:
colluding eavesdroppers, where geographically dispersed eavesdroppers adopt the maximal-ratio combining to process the wiretapped confidential information.
1) Secure Connectivity Probability: The secure connectivity probability τ c in the presence of multiple colluding eavesdroppers can be calculated by
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 3: In the case of colluding eavesdroppers, τ c can be calculated by (20) at the bottom of this page, where L I E (s) exp ( (s)) and (s) is given by (21) at the bottom of the next page.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix E. Although the analytical result given in Theorem 3 is general and exact, it is rather unwieldy, motivating the interest in acquiring a more compact expression. Exploring the tight lower bound of the CDF of the gamma random variable in [37] , a tight upper bound of τ c can be calculated as follows.
Theorem 4: τ c can be tightly upper bounded by
We leverage the tight lower bound of the CDF of a normalized gamma random variable, g with N degrees of freedom as Pr (x ≤ y)
1 − e −κ y N [37] , where κ = (N!) we have
Using the binomial expansion, we can obtain (24) at the bottom of this page. The bounds in Theorem 4 are validated in Fig. 2 , where we plot the secure connectivity probability τ c versus λ E . From Fig. 2 , we can find that theoretical curves coincide with simulation ones well, which show that the upper bound given in Theorem 4 is tight.
2) Average Number of Perfect Communication Links Per Unit Area: In the case of colluding eavesdroppers, the connection probability p con of the typical authorized user can be still calculated by (15) in Theorem 2, and the achievable secrecy probability p sec can be calculated by p sec,c = Pr
For getting the analysis result of p sec,c in (25), the CDF of I E should be available. Although the CDF of I E can be obtained from its Laplace transform L I E (s) by using the inverse Laplace transform calculation [38] , it could get computationally intensive in certain cases and may render the analysis intractable. As an alternative, we resort to an approximation method widely adopted in [4] , [8] , and [10] for getting an approximation of p sec,c which is given in the following theorem. Theorem 5: In the case of multiple colluding eavesdroppers, the approximation of p sec,c is given by
and N is the number of terms used in approximation.
Proof:
In (i ), w is a normalized gamma random variable with a shape parameter, N, and the approximation in (i ) is due to the fact that a normalized gamma random variable converges to identity when its shape parameter goes to infinity [4] , [8] .
Then, using the tight lower bound of the CDF of a normalized gamma random variable in [37] , p sec can be tightly upper bounded by
Finally, using the binomial expansion, (28) can be further rewritten as (26) . The approximate analysis result in Theorem 5 is validated in Fig. 3. From Fig. 3 , we can find that when N = 5, (26) can give an accurate approximation. Then, in the following simulations, we set N = 5 to calculate p sec,c , approximately. Finally, the number of perfect links in the network, N p can be calculated with (15) and (26), approximately.
IV. SECRECY PERFORMANCE OF THE
INTERFERENCE-LIMITED mmWave NETWORK WITH AN AN has been proved to be an efficient secure transmission strategy for the conventional cellular network [21] , [23] . But for the mmWave network, the utility of the AN should be re-evaluated due to the distinguishing features of the mmWave communication. In this section, we will analyze the secrecy performance of the AN-assisted mmWave communication.
Since the additional AN would increase the network interference, different from the previous section, we analyze the secrecy performance of the AN assisted mmWave communication by taking the inter-cell interference into consideration. 2 For obtaining a tractable problem, we only study the second secrecy performance metric: the average number of perfect communication links per unit area for the non-colluding eavesdroppers case.
By introducing different phase shifts in each directional antenna, each BS can concentrate the transmit power of the confidential information signals into the direction of its intended receiver, while radiating AN uniformly in all other directions. For tractability of the analysis, the actual array 2 In the mmWave network with AN, the transmitted AN simultaneously from each BS has made the transmissions of mmWave signals no longer highly directional. Therefore, different from mmWave network without AN, the outcell interference should be taken into consideration in the mmWave network with AN.
pattern of each BS is approximated by the model of sectoring with artificial noise proposed in [23, Sec. II-A]. In particular, for the confidential information signals, it has main lobe of gain M s and angle of spread θ b , and just as [23] and [39] , the sidelobes of the confidential information signals are assumed to be suppressed sufficiently, which can be omitted in the following. 3 Accordingly, for the AN, it has main lobe of gain M a and angle of spread 360 − θ b , and the sidelobes of the AN are suppressed sufficiently, which can also be omitted. The sectors of the confidential signals and AN are non-overlapping.
Assuming that φ P t is allocated to transmit the confidential information in the intended sector, and (1 − φ)P t is allocated to transmit AN concurrently out of intended sectors, where 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. The transmit power x(θ ) of each BS is given by (29) at the bottom of this page.
Then, according to the mapping theorem, for any receiver (authorized user or eavesdropper), the interfering BSs can be divided into two independent PPPs: 1) the one transmitting the confidential signals to the receiver, which is denoted by I of intensity λ B Pr x (M s ); 2) the one transmitting the AN to the receiver, which is denoted by A of intensity λ B Pr x (M a ).
A. Connection Probability
Considering the typical authorized user at the origin, its received SINR U can be calculated by
where the interference from multiple interfering BSs:
Theorem 6: The connection probability of the typical communication link can be tightly upper bounded by
where L and N have been defined in (32) and (33) respectively, at the bottom of the next page, a L and a N have been defined in Theorem 4, the analysis results of f r L (r ) and f r N (r ) have been given in Lemma 3, 3 We should point out that the analysis results obtained in this section can be generalized to incorporate the sidelobe leakage signals, by considering the eavesdroppers in the intended sector and outside the intended sector separately, just as Section III. However, the analysis results in such case would become more complicated, whilst few design insights can be brought. Furthermore, as we know, massive antenna array would be deployed at the mmWave BS for improving the mmWave signal transmission performance. Therefore, sidelobes of the antenna pattern at the mmWave BS can be suppressed sufficiently small, and it is reasonable to omit the sidelobe in the theoretical analysis. 
The proof is given in Appendix F. In Fig. 4 , we plot the connection probability p con versus T c . From Fig. 4 , we can find that approximate results coincide with simulation ones well, which show that the approximate analysis result given in Theorem 6 is tight. In addition, from simulation results, we can find an interesting phenomenon that for some T c , a larger λ B may result in a smaller p con . Therefore, we can conclude that p con is not a monotonically increasing function of λ B for the whole range of T c . This can be explained by the fact that although the distance from the authorized user to its serving BS decreases with the increasing λ B , the network interference also increases. Therefore, increasing λ B may not always improve p con . This further shows that the mmWave network with AN is interference-limited.
B. Secrecy Probability
In this subsection, we characterize the secrecy probability of the AN assisted mmWave communication. With (29) , only eavesdroppers inside the intended sector of the serving BS would wiretap the confidential information. Those eavesdroppers form a fan-shaped PPP and by the mapping theorem [34] , they can be mapped as a homogeneous PPP on the whole plane, denoted by Z with density λ E Pr x (M s ). Since we consider the worst-case where each eavesdropper can eliminate the interference due to the information signals from other interfering BSs, only the AN would deteriorate the receiving performance of eavesdroppers. Then, the received SINR by the eavesdropper at z can be calculated as
In the case of non-colluding eavesdroppers, the secrecy probability of the mmWave network with AN can be calculated as
, which is characterized by the following theorem.
Theorem 7: The secrecy probability can be tightly lower bounded by
and (s) has been defined in (36) at the bottom of the next page.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix G. Theoretical results in Theorem 7 are validated in Fig. 5 . In Fig. 5 , we plot the secrecy probability p sec versus T e . From  Fig. 5 , we can find that the approximate results coincide with the simulation ones well, which show that the lower bound given in Theorem 7 is tight.
V. SIMULATION RESULT
In this section, more representative simulation results are provided to characterize the secrecy performance of mmWave networks and the effect of different network parameters. Considering mmWave networks operating at a carrier frequency F c = 28 GHz, the path-loss model are taken from [5, Table I ]. Specially, the transmission bandwidth BW = 2 GHz, the noise figure F Fig. 1-Fig. 5 , all of the simulation results in this section are theoretical analysis results.
A. Secrecy Performance Evaluation of Noise-Limited mmWave Cellular Networks
In this subsection, employing analysis results in Section III, we illustrate the secrecy performance of noise-limited mmWave networks in the presence of non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers. Fig. 6 plots the secrecy connectivity probability of the mmWave communication in the presence of multiple noncolluding and colluding eavesdroppers versus λ E . Obviously, the wiretapping capability of the colluding eavesdroppers is larger than the non-colluding case. Therefore, compared with the non-colluding eavesdroppers, the secrecy connectivity probability for the colluding case deteriorates. With the increasing λ E , the wiretapping capability of eavesdroppers increases and the secrecy connectivity probability decreases. Furthermore, the secrecy performance would be improved with the improving directionality of the beamforming of each BSs. This can be explained by the fact that the high gain narrow beam antenna decreases the information leakage, improves the receive performance of the authorized user, and increases the secure connectivity probability. Fig. 7 plots N p versus λ E . Compared with the non-colluding eavesdroppers, the performance deterioration of the colluding case increases with the increasing λ E , especially for the BS equipped with highly directional antenna arrays. Furthermore, the simulation results show that the directional beamforming is very important for the secrecy communication. For example, for the non-colluding eavesdroppers case, when
and more than half of communication links is perfect, on average. However, for other two cases of array patterns, N p reduces greatly due to the increasing beam width of the main lobe and the decreasing array gains of the intended sector.
The simulation results above show that the directional beamforming of BSs is very important for the secrecy performance of noise-limited mmWave networks. Therefore, in practice, for improving the security of noise-limited mmWave networks, BSs should perform the highly directional beamforming.
B. Secrecy Performance Evaluation of Interference-Limited mmWave Cellular Networks With AN
In this subsection, employing analysis results in Section IV, we illustrate the impact of the AN on the secrecy performance of interference-limited mmWave networks in the presence of non-colluding eavesdroppers. Fig. 8 plots N p achieved by the mmWave communication versus the power allocation coefficient φ for different antenna patterns and λ E . From the simulation results in Fig. 8 , we find that the optimal fraction of the power allocated to the AN decreases with the decreasing λ E and the improving directivity of the antenna array equipped at each BS. This can be explained by the fact that with the decreasing λ E , the wiretapping capability of eavesdroppers decreases, and the optimal fraction of the power allocated to the AN can be reduced. Accordingly, with the highly directional beamforming, the information leakage decreases, and the receiving performance of eavesdroppers decreases. Therefore, the power allocated to the AN can be reduced. For showing the effect of λ E and θ b on the optimal φ further, we plot N p versus φ and λ E in Fig. 9 , and N p versus φ and θ b in Fig. 10 . From the simulation results, it is clear that the optimal φ for maximizing N P increases with the decreasing λ E and decreasing θ b , which validates the conclusions draw above.
Simulation results show that the optimal power allocated to AN depends on λ E and antenna pattern. The highly directional antenna array and small λ E both would decrease the power allocated to AN.
C. Secrecy Performance Comparison Between the AN Assisted Microwave Network and the AN Assisted mmWave Network
For validating the secrecy performance of the mmWave communication, we perform the secrecy performance comparison between the microwave network and mmWave network in Fig. 11 , where the intensities of microwave BSs and mmWave BSs are both set to be 0.0008. The carrier frequency of the microwave communication is F c = 2.5 GHz. Just as [23] and [39] , the antenna pattern of the microwave BS is approximated as (29) , where the beam width of the confidential signal is set to be 60°, and the beam width of AN is set to be 300°, the small scale channel fading of the microwave communication is the normalized Rayleigh fading. The large-scale path loss of the urban area cellular radio communication is used to model the path-loss of the microwave communication [40] , where the path-loss exponent is 2.7. Since the microwave network is interference-limited [23] , the received noise power is ignored in the simulation. Therefore, only the ratio between the antenna gain of the confidential signals and the antenna gain of AN would determine the SINR received at the typical authorized user and eavesdropper in the microwave network [23] . Just as [23] , the ratio between the antenna gain of the confidential signals and the antenna gain of AN in the microwave BS is set to be M − 1, where M is the number of antennas equipped at the microwave BS. In the simulation results of Fig. 11 , we set M = 6. From the simulation results in Fig. 11 , we can find that the mmWave network can achieve better secrecy performance than the microwave network. This is because the unique characteristic of the mmWave communication: blockage effects and highly directional beamforming antenna arrays. Due to blockage effects, the wiretapping capability of eavesdroppers would decrease, since the blockage effects would deteriorate the reception quality of a large portion of eavesdroppers. Due to the highly directional beamforming antenna arrays equipped at each mmWave BS, the reception quality of the intended receiver would be improved, and the confidential information leakage would be decreased.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, considering distinguishing features of the mmWave cellular network, we characterize the secrecy performance of the noise-limited mmWave network and the AN-assisted mmWave network. For the noise-limited case, we analyze the secure connectivity probability and average number of perfect communication links per unit area for colluding and non-colluding eavesdroppers. For the AN-assisted mmWave network which is interference-limited, by taking the network interference into consideration, we characterize the distributions of the received SINRs at the intended receiver and eavesdroppers, and average number of perfect communication links per unit area for non-colluding eavesdroppers. Simulation results show that the array pattern and intensity of eavesdroppers are very important system parameters for improving the secrecy performance of the mmWave communication.
In particular, for the AN-assisted mmWave networks, the power allocated to AN depends on the array pattern and the intensity of eavesdroppers. It decreases with the decreasing beam width of the main lobe and decreasing intensity of eavesdroppers. 
Then, with (37) 
that can be derived as (4) .
Secondly, invoking the PPP's void probability [34] , the CCDF Pr d * N ≥ r can be derived as (38) at the bottom of this page. 
Accordingly, the analysis result of A L can be derived with the procedures in (40) at the bottom of this page. (5) into (40), we obtain
We first show the derivation of f r L (r ). The CCDF Pr (r L ≥ r ) can be derived with the procedures in (41) at the bottom of this page, where step (a) can be derived by the PPP's void probability and
, the pdf f r L (r ) can be derived as (7) .
We show the derivation of f r N (r ). The CCDF Pr (r N ≥ r ) is equivalent to the conditional CCDF in (42) at the bottom of this page. We first derive the first term in (42) as (43) at the bottom of this page, where step (b) is obtained according to the PPP's void probability.
Finally, we derive the second term in (42). Since the LOS BS process and NLOS BS process are two independent PPPs, we have
Substituting (44) and (43) into (42), f r N (r ) = − dPr(r N ≥r) dr , which can be derived as (8) .
APPENDIX D PROOF OF LEMMA 4
The point process N E can be regarded as a transformation of the point process E by the probability kernel p (z, A) =
According to the displacement theorem [34] , N E is a PPP on R + with the intensity measure E (0, t) given by
From the blockage model in Section II-B, we know that E is divided into two independent point processes, i.e., the LOS and NLOS eavesdropper processes. Furthermore, the directivity gains received at the eavesdroppers in the main and sidelobes are different. Therefore, considering these and changing to a polar coordinate system, E (0, t) in (45) can be further derived as (46) at the top of this page, where g r denotes the small-scale fading of eavesdropper which is r distant from the target BS at x. g r ∼ gamma (N L , 1) if the link between the eavesdropper and the target BS is LOS, otherwise, g r ∼ gamma (N N , 1) .
For getting the analysis result E (0, t), the analysis results of integral formulaes in (46) should be derived. Firstly, the integral 
Step (a) is due to g r ∼ gamma N j , 1 , step (b) is due to [36, 
Finally, substituting (47) and (48) into (46), the proof can be completed.
APPENDIX E PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The achievable secure connectivity probability, τ c can be calculated as (49) at the top of this page, where step (g) holds, since the serving BS at x * can be a LOS or NLOS BS, and step (h) is due to the Laplace transform property t n f (t)
In the following, we derive the analysis result of L I E (s).
step (i ) is obtained by using the probability generating functional (PGFL), step (k) is obtained by using integration by parts, and step (v) is obtained by the variable replacing z = 
Finally, substituting (52) and (53) into (51), the closed-form result of L I E (s) can be obtained.
APPENDIX F PROOF OF THEOREM 6
Using total probability theorem, we have
In the following, we detail the calculation of the conditional probability Q 1 . The conditional probability Q 2 can be calculated with a similar procedure which is omitted for brevity. In the following, we denote the LOS terms in i as i,L and the NLOS terms in i as i,N , for i = I, A. The analysis result of Q 1 can be derived with the procedures in (55) at the bottom of this page, where step (z) is due to the tight lower bound of the CDF of the gamma random variable given in [37] ; step (x) is due to the multinomial expansion and Laplace transform of the gamma random variable.
On the condition that the serving BS is a LOS BS and the distance from the serving BS to the typical user is r L , from the user association policy in Section II-F, we know that the nearest distance from the interfering BS in I,L and A,L to the typical authorized user should be larger than r L , and the nearest distance from the interfering BS in I,N and A,N to the typical authorized user should be larger than
Then, using PGFL, we have
Similarly, the analysis resut of
can be obtained. Finally, substituting the pdf of r L into (55), the proof can be completed.
APPENDIX G PROOF OF THEOREM 7
In the following, for the convenience of expression, we denote the set of the LOS eavesdroppers in Z as Z ,L , and denote the set of the NLOS eavesdroppers as Z ,N .
Since the AN signals received at multiple eavesdroppers are not independent, we resort to the technique in [23] to derive a lower bound of p sec . We first derive the conditional secrecy probability conditioned on A . Then, with the Jensen's inequality, we derive a lower bound of p sec with the procedures in (57) at the top of the next page, where r denotes the link length between the eavesdropper and the serving BS. We should point out that the conditional probabilities in the first line of the equation (57) denote the probabilities that the SINR received by eavesdroppers at different positions is not 
larger than T e , conditioned on a common A . Changing to a polar coordinate system and using Jensen's inequality, we can obtain step (n).
In the equation (58) at the top of this page, we first show the derivation of Pr SINR z ≥ T e |z ∈ Z ,L . Since g x * z ∼ gamma (N L , 1), step (v) in the equation (58) can be obtained with the inequality in [37] . Then, similar procedures can be adopted to derive Pr SINR z ≥ T e |z ∈ Z ,N , which are omitted, for brevity.
For facilitating the derivations, we first introduce the following definition.
Definition 2: The path loss process with fading (PLPF) N z is the point process on R + mapped from A , where
M a g yz L(y,z) , y ∈ A and z ∈ R 2 . We sort the elements of N z in ascending order and introduce the index such that ζ i ≤ ζ j for ∀i < j .
Then, following the proof of Lemma 4, the intensity measure of N z can be calculated as (59) 
Step (k) is obtained by the variable replacing z = 1 x . Following derivations of the analysis result of (50) in the proof of Theorem 3, we can derive the analysis result of L I Az (s). Substituting the analysis result of L I Az (s) into (58), the analysis result of Pr SINR z ≥ T e |z ∈ Z ,L can be obtained.
